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LAND TRUSTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: HOW TAX ABUSE AND CORPORATE




Massachusetts's The Trustees of Reservations became
the nation's first land trust' in 1891 by acquiring the twenty-
acre Virginia Woods as its first property to preserve.2 Now,
more than one hundred years later, land trusts operate in all
fifty states.3
Paralleling dramatic population growth and sprawl,4 land
trust growth gained momentum in the 1980s with the
passage of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act,5 as well
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 49; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law, 2009; B.S., Sociology, Santa Clara
University, 2005. I wish to thank Dean Donald Polden for his guidance and
direction in writing this comment. I also thank my fiancd Pat for his
unwavering love and support throughout law school.
1. A land trust is "[a] land-ownership arrangement by which a trustee
holds both legal and equitable title to land while the beneficiary retains the
power to direct the trustee, manage the property, and draw income from the
trust." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1549 (8th ed. 2004).
2. The Trustees of Reservations, About Us, Timeline,
http://www.thetrustees.org/pages/90_timeline.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
3. RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA 40 (2003).
4. See Julie Ann Gustanski, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements,
Voluntary Actions, and Private Lands, in PROTECTING THE LAND:
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 9, 17 (Julie Ann
Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
5. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
adopted the UCEA in 1981. Uniform Law Commissioners, A
Few Facts about the Uniform Conservation Easement Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucea.asp
(last visited Mar. 15, 2009) [hereinafter UCEA]. The Uniform Conservation
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as a new tax provision that allowed for an income tax
deduction for a charitable contribution of land.' The
conservation movement also encouraged the passage of
additional tax incentives in the twenty-first century.7
However, as with any kind of financially motivating laws,
abuse is inevitable. Particularly with the fair market
valuations that must occur when a donor contributes land,
appraisals hinder the conservation process by enabling self-
interested landowners to attain an inaccurately high land
value estimate so as to deduct more income taxes." Today,
land trusts' goodwill suffer from transacting with landowners
who attain dishonest appraisals.' The reputations of land
trusts have also been tarnished by the unethical practices of
The Nature Conservancy, one specific land trust that has
drawn the negative attention of journalists and Congress. °
This comment explores the pivotal role of land trusts in
the conservation boom and in upholding the integrity of land
conservation. Part II provides a background of land trusts
and their functions; it also reviews how land conservation and
land trusts became popular as a result of statutory changes in
federal tax law, and how such popularity has encouraged
even more pro-conservation legislation.1 Part III presents
one of the major threats to the conservation movement: tax
abuse. 2 Part IV analyzes this problem from the viewpoint of
individual landowners seeking hefty income tax deductions
Easement Act defines a conservation easement as:
a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing
limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include
retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real
property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational,
or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or
enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical,
architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
UCEA § 1(1).
6. I.R.C. § 170(h) (2006).
7. See, e.g., Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1206,
120 Stat. 780, 783 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.), available
at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ppa2006.pdf.
8. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
9. See discussion infra Part WV.B.
10. See David B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, Nonprofit Land Bank Amasses
Billions; Charity Builds Assets on Corporate Partnerships, WASH. POST, May 4,
2003, at A01.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
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and discusses how land trusts, and The Nature Conservancy
in particular, can lose sight of their missions to conserve by
engaging in unethical, profit-motivated behavior. 3 Part V's
proposal suggests a number of methods all parties involved in
land conservation can implement to adhere to ethical and
responsible standards. 4
II. BACKGROUND: LAND TRUSTS
A. Land Trusts in the United States
As awareness of environmental issues and the
importance of land conservation continues to grow, the
United States has seen a boom in legislation and programs
aimed at protecting various land resources. 5 Land trusts
have blossomed and developed into the main facilitators of
land preservation. 16  By helping landowners conserve their
land, land trusts "act to acquire land, conservation
easements, management agreements, or other interests in
real property for the purpose of enabling public benefit from
the land."" Land trusts protect a variety of types of land,
including wildlife habitats, forests, open space, watersheds,
wetlands, scenic views and roads, and ecosystems. 8
Midway through the twentieth century, about fifty land
trusts existed, mostly in the Northeast region of the United
States. 19  Spurred by rapid population growth and land
development, the number of land trusts began to steadily
increase in the 1960s.20 As of 2005 there were more than
1600 land trusts across the country, a thirty-two percent
increase since 2000.21 California is home to the highest
number of land trusts-198 as of 2005, conserving 1,732,471
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. Gustanski, supra note 4, at 12.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 21.
19. Id. at 17.
20. ROB ALDRICH ET AL., LAND TRUST ALLIANCE: 2005 NATIONAL
LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT 12 fig.6 (2005), available at
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/land-trust-census/2005-report.pdf
[hereinafter CENSUS].
21. Id. at 5.
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acres of land.2 2 However, the largest concentration of land
trusts is still in the Northeast.23 As a whole, the United
States conserves nearly twelve million acres of land.24
Americans have demonstrated an interest in land trusts
and preservation by increasing state and local bond
initiatives for conservation.2 5 The year 2006 witnessed the
passage of 133 measures in California, Georgia, New Jersey,
South Carolina, and Texas, collectively approving $6.7 billion
for conservation. 26  A boost in philanthropic endeavors also
reflects the public's awareness of conservation efforts. The
end of 2005 saw land trust membership reach 1.5 million,27
with monetary donations doubling land trusts' operating
budgets between 2000 and 2005.28 The number of land trust
volunteers also grew a remarkable sixty-three percent within
the same time period.29
Not only are the hundreds of land trusts across the
United States diverse, but the type of land protected varies as
well. Nine land trusts operate nationwide"° and at least two
of those, The Nature Conservancy and The Humane Society
of the United States Wildlife Land Trust, also operate in
22. Id. at 20 chart 5.
23. Id. at 21. More than 3.5 million acres, or thirty percent of the total
number of acres conserved in the United States, are protected in the Northeast.
See id. at 21-22 chart 5. "The preponderance of land trusts in the Northeast
reflects the birth of land trusts there more than 100 years ago." Id. at 5.
24. ALDRICH ETAL., supra note 20, at 21 chart 5.
25. See id. at 7.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 12. While memberships with different land trusts vary, individual
members of the Land Trust Alliance, for example, pay thirty-five dollars and
receive "a year's subscription of Saving Land, the national journal for land
trusts and conservation" and the recognition that they subscribe to the
conservation efforts of the Alliance. Land Trust Alliance, Get Involved,
Membership, Individual Membership, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/get-
involvedlmembership/individual/individual (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
28. ALDRICH ET AL., supra note 20, at 12.
29. Id. There were 55,597 volunteers in 2000 and 90,871 in 2005. Id.
While large land trusts have plentiful budgets, many organizations are very
small with minimal budgets, operated solely by volunteers. Federico Cheever,
Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation
Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077,
1085 (1996).
30. Land Trust Alliance, Land Trusts Operating Nationally,
http://www.protectprivateconservation.com/resources/links/natl-sponsors.htm
(last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
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foreign countries. 1 Local land trusts, on the other hand,
operate on a smaller scale and employ unique approaches to
conserving local resources.3 2 The diversity of local land trusts
stems from differences in vegetation, state and local laws, and
the individual cultures of the people living in each locality.3
Nearly all of the country's land trusts belong to the Land
Trust Alliance, a non-profit organization whose mission is to
"save the places people love by strengthening land
conservation across America."34 The Land Trust Alliance
encourages the successful operation of land trusts by
organizing a national rally, issuing a variety of publications,35
promulgating ethical standards and practices for adoption by
land trusts,36 and representing land conservation values at
the nation's capital.3 ' The emphasis that the Land Trust
Alliance places upon land trust education and effective
operation demonstrates that the popularity of land donation
and conservation is not immune to vulnerability. This
comment will expose some weaknesses of land trusts as
nonprofit organizations.
B. Land Trust Functions
1. The Popularity of Conservation Easements
Although land trusts can conserve land in any number of
31. See The Nature Conservancy, Where We Work,
http://www.nature.orgwherewework/?src=t3 (last visited Mar. 15, 2009);
Wildlife Land Trust, The Humane Society of the United States, Protected
Sanctuaries, http://www.wlt.org/sanctuaries.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
32. See BREWER, supra note 3, at 269.
33. See id.
34. Land Trust Alliance, About Us, Who We Are,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/who-we-are (last visited Mar. 15,
2009).
35. Publications include books, videos, brochures, and software covering a
range of topics, including fundraising, land transactions, landowner resources,
and organizational management. See Land Trust Alliance, Resources,
Publications, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/resources/publications (last
visited Mar. 15, 2009).
36. Land Trust Standards and Practices was first published in 1989. The
2004 revised edition is available online. The Land Trust Alliance requires that
all of its member land trusts adopt the Land Trust Standards and Practices.
See LAND TRUST ALLIANCE: LAND TRUST STANDARDS AND PRACTICES
(2004), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/learning/sp/lt-standards-
practices07.pdf.
37. BREWER, supra note 3, at 178-79.
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ways, acquisition typically arises either through fee simple3"
ownership or a conservation easement.3 9 Land trusts often
acquire title in fee, which means title passes completely from
the original landowner to the land trust.4" With a
conservation easement, however, land trusts merely hold a
right to protect the land and prevent development.41
Protection by a conservation easement has surpassed all
other methods of acquisition and is the most common means
for private land conservation in the country. 42 By the end of
2005, conservation easements protected more than six million
acres of land.43
Conservation easements appeal to landowners for a
number of reasons. Essential to the concept of a conservation
easement is that the landowner retains private ownership of
the preserved land while giving up specific rights that ensure
its conservation." Because conservation easements aim to
protect land, a landowner normally relinquishes the right to
develop, subdivide, and/or log trees.46 Land trusts work with
landowners to tailor each conservation easement to the
particular needs and interests of the individual owner and
property.46 Conservation easements also normally enable a
landowner to retain possessory rights, allowing the
landowner to continue residing on the land while ensuring its
lasting protection.47
2. Methods of Acquisition
While contract flexibility makes conservation easements
extremely popular, donating or selling title to a land trust
38. Fee simple is "[an interest in land that, being the broadest property
interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 648 (8th ed. 2004).
39. Duncan M. Greene, Comment, Dynamic Conservation Easements:
Facing the Problem of Perpetuity in Land Conservation, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
883, 887 (2005).
40. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
41. UCEA, supra note 5, § 1(1).
42. Gustanski, supra note 4, at 9.
43. ALDRICH ETAL., supra note 20, at 20 chart 5.
44. See JANET DIEHL & THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION
EASEMENT HANDBOOK: MANAGING LAND CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC
PRESERVATION EASEMENT PROGRAMS 5 (1988).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Greene, supra note 39, at 889.
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serves as the easiest way to ensure conservation.48
Landowners have several options with respect to land
donations: donating land outright, donating a remainder
interest with a life estate,49 or donating by will.50 Financial
incentives to donate land include both relief from property
taxes and other taxes imposed on the sale of land (i.e., capital
gains, conveyance, and transfer taxes).51  Moreover,
landowners who donate their land can take an income tax
deduction for the fair market value of the land as a charitable
donation. 2 Landowners can also donate land and continue to
receive income through a charitable gift annuity 3 or a
charitable remainder unitrust.54
For landowners who wish to receive some cash in
exchange for their land, land trusts can arrange bargain
sales.5 5 Through a bargain sale, the land trust buys the
landowner's land for less than fair market value.56 The
landowner receives the reduced purchase price and the ability
to deduct the difference between the fair market value and
48. See BREWER, supra note 3, at 140.
49. The landowner owns the land for the remainder of her lifetime (she has
a life estate) and upon her death the land passes to a land trust (the trust has
the remainder interest). See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 588, 1319 (8th ed. 2004).
50. Russell K. Osgood & Roger E. Koontz, A Summary of Forms and Tax
Consequences of Land Acquisition by a Charity, in LAND-SAVING ACTION 135,
137 (Russell L. Brenneman & Sarah M. Bates eds., 1984).
51. Id. at 136.
52. See discussion of tax legislation infra Part II.C. See also BREWER, supra
note 3, at 141.
53. A charitable gift annuity is "a contract under which a charity, in return
for a transfer of cash or other property, agrees to pay a fixed sum of money for a
period measured by one or two lives." American Council on Gift Annuities,
Donors' Corner, http://www.acga-web.org/donorscorner.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2009); see also I.R.C. § 664(d)(1) (2006).
54. Like a charitable gift annuity, charitable remainder unitrusts (or
CRUTs) allow the land donor (the income beneficiary) to receive annual income
payments from the land trust, except a CRUT pays the landowner a fixed
percentage (between five and fifty percent) of the net fair market value of the
land. See I.R.C. § 664(d)(2). Charitable gift annuities and CRUTs are often
utilized by landowners with a lot of equity who would experience high capital
gains tax consequences if they sold their land. Land Trust Alliance, Have Land
to Save?, How to Conserve Your Land, Additional Conservation
Methods, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conserve/have-land-to-save/how-to-
conserve-your-land-i/conservation-methods (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
55. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 54.
56. Id.
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the purchase price as a charitable contribution."
When a land trust acquires a conservation easement, the
landowner receives a tax benefit because the development
restriction has decreased the value of the property.5" To
determine the amount of a deduction for donating a
conservation easement to a land trust, an appraiser
determines the fair market value of the property both before
and after the conservation restrictions are imposed.59 The
difference between the two values represents the deductible
amount.6 °
3. Land Trusts Compared to Government Agencies
While landowners may donate a property interest to a
governmental municipality and receive a tax deduction,61 the
proliferation of private land trusts in the past twenty-five
years demonstrates the desirability of working with a private
organization.62 There is no doubt that landowners prefer the
ease of working with the private sector with respect to land
conservation transactions.63
Nonprofit land trusts offer a level of service to
landowners and potential donors that their governmental
counterparts cannot provide. 64  Land trusts attract land
donors because they, as private organizations, can handle
deals quickly, flexibly, and privately.65 Land trusts also
proffer effective negotiations with varying contract provisions
and knowledgeable staff members who can help a deal
progress. 66
Although conserved lands often go to land trusts
originally, many land trusts sell or donate the land to a state
57. Id.
58. Robert E. Suminsby, Appraising Deductible Restrictions, in LAND-
SAVING ACTION, supra note 50, at 198, 198.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. I.R.C. § 170(h)(3)(A) (2006).
62. See Eve Endicott, Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol'y, Introduction to LAND
CONSERVATION THROUGH PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 3, 6 (Eve Endicott
ed., 1993).
63. See id. at 4.
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or federal agency." Known as a "pass-through," this type of
land transfer enables land trusts and landowners to have
efficient and flexible transactions while transferring the
responsibility of managing and monitoring the land to a
public agency. 68 Pass-through land transfers exemplify how
land trusts aim to accommodate landowners' personal desires
while ensuring that the land is regulated by an agency with
69plentiful resources.
C. Legislative Promulgation of Conservation Boom
The legal developments surrounding land conservation
that have ensued since 1980 help explain how the practice of
land preservation grew so quickly. The Internal Revenue
Code ("I.R.C.") section 170(h) and the Uniform Conservation
Easement Act are the two laws that have the greatest effect
on land conservation.
1. Tax Code Changes
In 1980, under President Jimmy Carter, Congress passed
new tax legislation to codify permanently "the deductibility of
conservation and historic preservation easement donations."70
Although the contribution need not be an easement, I.R.C.
section 170(h) defines a "qualified conservation contribution"
as a contribution to a qualified organization exclusively for
conservation purposes, granted in perpetuity. 71 The passage
of I.R.C. section 170(h) permitted a landowner to take a
charitable tax deduction of up to thirty percent of her
adjusted gross income for the donation of a qualified
conservation contribution for the year of the transaction plus
the five following years.72 The passage of this tax provision
67. BREWER, supra note 3, at 91.
68. See id. Private conservation deals involving large or expensive areas of
land particularly benefit from government partnerships because sizeable areas
of land often cover several political jurisdictions and need the resources of the
taxpayer. See Endicott, supra note 62, at 6.
69. See BREWER, supra note 3, at 91.
70. Stephen J. Small, An Obscure Tax Code Provision Takes Private Land
Protection into the Twenty-First Century, in PROTECTING THE LAND:
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note 4, at 55,
56-57.
71. I.R.C. § 170(h) (2006).
72. J. Breting Engel, The Development, Status, and Viability of the
Conservation Easement as a Private Land Conservation Tool in the Western
2009] 1131
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coincided with rising land values and an ever-growing
demand for land; it was an optimal time for the government
to pass tax incentives that would encourage conservation.73
2. Model Conservation Easement Statute
Although a clear factor, the revised tax code was not the
sole contributor to the land trust boom.74 The early 1980s
also saw the approval of the Uniform Conservation Easement
Act (the "UCEA") by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.7" Adopted in all but
one state," the UCEA "established the model for state
statutes to codify the conservation easement as a unique
property interest"7 and immunized conservation easements
from adverse common law principles. 8 Although not all land
trusts hold conservation easements, those that do "must
conform to the requirements for easement holders imposed by
the conservation easement statutes in the states in which
they operate."79  Essentially, the UCEA enables a
governmental or charitable organization, trust, or association
whose purpose is to protect natural, scenic, or cultural
resources to hold conservation easements.80
The tax code revisions and the passage of the UCEA laid
the foundation for the donation of land and conservation
easements. These important preliminary steps paved the
way for charitable contributions of open space to take place in
the private sector. Land trusts have become the convenient
choice as preservers of donated land.8 ' As nonprofit
organizations, they serve a purpose the government would
otherwise have to serve and they gain the trust of the public
United States, 39 URB. LAW. 19, 41 (2007).
73. Small, supra note 70, at 55.
74. Id.
75. Gustanski, supra note 4, at 11.
76. See BREWER, supra note 3, at 150. Wyoming is the only state that has
not either adopted the UCEA or written a statute mirroring the provisions of
the UCEA's authorization of conservation easements. Id.
77. Engel, supra note 72, at 38.
78. Id.
79. Cheever, supra note 29, at 1083-84.
80. Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good:
Preserving the Environment on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373, 387-
88 (2001).
81. See Endicott, supra note 62, at 4-5.
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by not providing a benefit to any private shareholders.
D. Results of the Boom
1. Recent Legislation
The success of initial conservation legislation encouraged
the passage of additional tax incentives. The Taxpayer
Protection Act, enacted in 1997, added section 2031(c) to the
tax code. 2 This section enables a decedent's estate to deduct
up to forty percent of the conserved land's value, capped at
$500,000, from the decedent's federal estate tax liability. 3
Estate tax breaks invaluably benefit heirs of land who wish to
keep it undeveloped but would be unable to afford the estate
tax liability were the land not conserved by the decedent."
There is no doubt that much of the popularity of land
conservation can be credited to the financial incentives
available to landowners, in addition to pure altruism.5
Although the original I.R.C. section 170(h) offered appealing
tax deductions to landowners who donated at least a partial
property interest to a land trust, the tax incentive to donate
land increased in 2006.6 President George W. Bush signed
the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which increased the
deduction to up to fifty percent of the landowner's adjusted
gross income along with an extension of the carry-forward
period from five to fifteen years after the year of the
transaction. In other words, a land donor can deduct up to
fifty percent of his taxable income in the year he donates the
land and for the following fifteen years.8 8 The new tax
benefits expired at the end of 2007; however, they were
renewed for an additional two years in May 2008.9 These tax
82. Small, supra note 70, at 60; I.R.C. § 2031(c) (2006).
83. Small, supra note 70, at 61.
84. See Engel, supra note 72, at 49.
85. Trey Garrison, The Lawyer of the Landowner, THE LAND REPORT, July
2007, at 47-48.
86. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1206, 120




89. Land Trust Alliance, Policy Action, Tax Policy,
Working for a Permanent Easement Incentive,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/taxincentives/federal (last visited Mar.
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incentives are set to expire at the end of 2009.90
Tax incentives, such as those offered in the Pension
Protection Act, play a major role in a landowner's decision to
donate conservation easements or all or part of her land in fee
to land trusts. 91 The tax savings realized by donating land or
a conservation easement is not always the most financially
wise decision, however. 92 Landowners who have a relatively
low income or an extremely valuable piece of land cannot
maximize the financial advantage of their donation in tax
deductions. 9 Increasing the allowable deduction and carry-
forward period demonstrates how increased incentives work
to make donative land conservation appealing to a wider
array of landowners. Thus, legislation that heightens
permanently the amount deductible for donating such
property interests is vital to the continued success of land
trusts.
2. Negative Consequences
Unfortunately, income tax breaks in any form attract
dishonest taxpayers who abuse the system by claiming more
deductions than legally permissible. In the realm of land
conservation, tax abuse results when taxpayers claim
charitable contribution deductions for "amounts that exceed
the fair market value of the donated easement [or land]. "
Landowners often find ways of inflating the fair market value
of their land in an attempt to increase their deductions.9"
Landowners have also donated conservation easements on
lands not intended to be developed, for example, by
restricting the development of golf courses and unusable
areas of completed subdivisions.96 In other words, they have
received tax deductions for restricting development that they
15, 2008).
90. Id.
91. See Engel, supra note 72, at 40.
92. See BREWER, supra note 3, at 141.
93. See id.
94. I.R.S. Notice IR-2004-86 (June 30, 2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,,id=124485,00.html [hereinafter I.R.S.
Notice IR-2004-86].
95. Garrison, supra note 85, at 51.
96. Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Conservation Easements: Developers
Find Payoff in Preservation, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at AO1.
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know would never occur in the first place.
In 2003, the Washington Post published an expos6 on
conservation easement abuse." The series of articles caught
the attention of Congress and the Internal Revenue Service
(the "IRS"),9" and also paralleled litigation in federal court.99
One of the world's largest land trusts, The Nature
Conservancy (the "Conservancy"), 100 was the center of
attention in Congress's investigation' 01 and threatened to
ruin the reputation of land trusts' conservation efforts.'0 2
III. PROBLEM: EASEMENT AND TAX ABUSE
As illustrated above, the conservation boom elevated land
preservation to one of the hottest topics in environmental
protection. As a result, land trusts stand out as nonprofit
organizations that specialize in acquiring land and
conservation easements to permanently restrict future
development. In addition to a desire to protect land, grantor
landowners and grantee land trusts have something else in
common: income tax benefits. Abuses of the conservation
system threaten both individual landowners who donate
property interests and land trusts that successfully operate
because of their tax-exempt status.
The following section analyzes how landowners abuse
conservation easements by either obtaining an appraisal that
overestimates the fair market value of the property or by
placing a restrictive easement upon property that does not
qualify for a tax deduction.'013 The analysis will also consider
97. See Ottoway & Stephens, supra note 10.
98. In 2004, the IRS issued two notices regarding the improper deductions
for conservation easement and charitable contribution donations. See I.R.S.
Notice IR-2004-86, supra note 94; see also I.R.S. Notice 2004-41 (July 12, 2004),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-04-41.pdf [hereinafter I.R.S.
Notice 2004-41].
99. See Bischel v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Nev. 2006);
Turner v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 299 (2006).
100. The Nature Conservancy, About Us,
http://www.nature.orglaboutus/?src=t5 (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
101. See Engel, supra note 72, at 52; see also STAFF OF S. COMM.
ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG., COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE
NATURE CONSERVANCY (Comm. Print 2005), available at
http://www.senate.gov/%7Efinance/hearings/other/tnccontents.pdf.
102. See Engel, supra note 72, at 52.
103. To receive a charitable contribution tax deduction for donating a real
property interest, the I.R.C. defines a qualified real property interest as any of
2009] 1135
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the trouble the Conservancy encountered after the
Washington Post exposed its unscrupulous business practices.
Land trusts across the county must learn from the
Conservancy's mistakes and work to maintain the legitimacy
of land trusts and private land conservation. This analysis
aims to reconcile how increased tax incentives can promote
genuine conservation measures while also undermining it by
encouraging easement abusers to wrongfully obtain tax
deductions. With congressional legislation working to make
the substantial income tax deductions for donors of
conservation easements a permanent part of the tax code,
scrutinizing the effects of such legislation is imperative.
IV. ANALYSIS: SHEDDING LIGHT ON EASEMENT
AND TAX ABUSE
Investigative reporters for the Washington Post, David B.
Ottaway and Joe Stephens, wrote a series of articles 10 4
exposing the general abuses of land conservation and
improper conduct by the Conservancy. 15 As a result of their
depiction, the Senate Joint Committee on Taxation proposed
to change, or possibly do away with, the tax incentives
encouraging private land preservation. 1 6  The Senate
Finance Committee also investigated the Conservancy with
the hope of understanding the issues raised by the
Washington Post with regard to federal tax benefits available
to exempt organizations and donors of charitable gifts.'0 7
A. Landowners Claiming Inappropriate Deductions
Although the Washington Post articles brought
considerable attention to the Conservancy, the expos6 also
the following: "(A) the entire interest of the donor other than a qualified mineral
interest, (B) a remainder interest, and (C) a restriction (granted in perpetuity)
on the use which may be made of the real property." I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)-(2)
(2006).
104. See Joe Stephens, Fairfax Case Draws Line on Easements, WASH. POST,
June 4, 2006, at A01 [hereinafter Stephens, Fairfax Case]; Joe Stephens, IRS
Starts Team on Easement Abuses, WASH. POST, June 9, 2005, at A06
[hereinafter Stephens, Easement Abuses]; Stephens & Ottaway, supra note 96;
Ottoway & Stephens, supra note 10.
105. See Ottoway & Stephens, supra note 10.
106. Engel, supra note 72, at 51.
107. Id. at 52.
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touched upon a number of deceptive practices employed by
landowners who wanted to deduct a substantial amount from
their income taxes. 108 Because appraisals are inexact, it
comes as no surprise that the main form of abuse stems from
appraisal valuations. °9 The fair market value of potentially
donated land represents a main consideration for a grantor;110
the higher the appraised value of the land a grantor obtains,
the larger the income tax deduction she will receive.
Treasury Regulations define fair market value as "the price
at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts.""' Although this concept can be
easily stated, the most prevalent factual disputes in federal
taxation come from disagreements over fair market
valuation"12 because of the inherent subjectivity of the
appraisal process.' Each parcel of land is unique and as a
result the Treasury Regulations have not set forth a specific
rule for determining fair market value.114
Although no definite rule exists for determining fair
market value, there are three professionally accepted
methods of estimating the value: the "Comparable Sales"
(market data) approach, the "Cost" approach, and the
"Income" approach." 5  However, each of these methods
108. See Stephens & Ottaway, supra note 96; Stephens, Easement Abuses,
supra note 104.
109. Thomas A. Coughlin III, Increased Tax Penalties for Valuation
Overstatements, in LAND-SAVING ACTION, supra note 50, at 210, 210.
110. Id.
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c)(1) (1960).
112. Coughlin, supra note 109, at 210.
113. Alex E. Sadler, The Inherent Ambiguity of Commercial Real Estate
Values, 13 VA. TAX REV. 787, 800 (1994).
114. Id. at 801.
115. THE LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, APPRAISING EASEMENTS: GUIDELINES FOR
VALUATION OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND LAND CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
24 (2d ed. 1990). The "Comparable Sales" approach compares the sales of
similar properties recently sold in the same or similar market. Id. This
approach is not reliable when there are few comparable sales from which a fair
market value can be derived, which is common for properties with conservation
easements. Id. The "Cost" approach, which is based on the premise "that an
improved property will sell at a price reasonably related to the depreciated cost
of a newly constructed version of itself," is typically inappropriate for vacant
land. Id. at 26. The "Income" approach capitalizes the net operating income
that a property generates at an acceptable rate. Id. at 27. When estimating the
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requires making certain assumptions about the real estate
market, which causes the process to be inherently
ambiguous. 116 If an appraisal does become the focus of tax
litigation, the appraiser will testify about his or her
professional qualifications and familiarity with the market of
the land on which the valuation was made."' When an
appraiser lacks credibility in these areas or fails to introduce
reliable evidence to substantiate the valuation, courts have
shown a tendency to reject the fair market valuation.1 8
The following subsections will explore the issue of
inaccurate valuations specific to open space and conservation
easements.
1. Examples of Early Tax Abuse
Even before donating land to a land trust became a
popular method of land conservation, the IRS challenged
charitable contribution deductions resulting from land
donation and laid the legal groundwork for disallowing
deductions based on improper appraisals."19
In 1983, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit ruled in favor of the IRS in Great Northern Nekoosa
Corp. v. United States.2 ' Great Northern Nekoosa
Corporation ("Great Northern"), the taxpayer, donated the
Allagash Falls to the State of Maine for charitable purposes
in 1969.121 Great Northern had purchased the 640 acres in
1943 for $25,000.122 When Great Northern decided to donate
the land, it used an expert appraiser to determine the fair
market value for income tax deduction purposes. 123  The
appraiser determined the fair market value to be at least
$1,000,000, basing his valuation on the property's possible
use as a hydroelectric power plant site, even though the
value of an easement, all of the approaches should be used when possible for
determining both the before and after valuations. Id. at 24.
116. See Sadler, supra note 113, at 803-04.
117. See id. at 808.
118. See id.
119. See Akers v. Comm'r, 799 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1986); Great Northern
Nekoosa Corp. v. United States, 711 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1983).
120. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 711 F.2d at 475-76.
121. Id. at 473-74.
122. Id. at 473.
123. Id. at 474.
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United States enacted the National Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act that prohibited the construction of a power plant at
Allagash Falls.'24 Conversely, the IRS's expert appraised the
value of the land to be $26,240, a value that did not take into
consideration a potential power site. 125
After the IRS assessed Great Northern with an income
tax deficiency of nearly $700,000, including interest, Great
Northern paid the deficiency and brought suit in federal
district court for a refund.126 At the appellate court, Great
Northern lost its appeal after failing to meet its burden of
proof 127 that "any rational prospective purchase[r]"' 28 would
not take the encumbrance of the National Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act into consideration when purchasing the land.129
Three years later, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit addressed whether the fair market value of
a donated parcel of land could be determined by its value if
subdivided. 3 ° In this case, the taxpayer landowners, the
Akers, bought the Treanor Tract for $125,000 in 1965."'1 The
Akers granted a scenic easement to the Tennessee
Conservation League in 1977 and an appraiser valued the
land at $971,000 32 --its value had it been divided into twenty-
four lots. 33 The IRS's expert appraised the land at a fair
market value of $505,000-almost half of what the Akerses'
appraiser estimated."' Again, the court found for the IRS,
rejecting the fair market value that considered the land's
subdivided value.135  The court reasoned that the land
conveyed prior to the easement was one parcel and that "the
regulatory definition does suggest that the appropriate
question is what a hypothetical Malcolm Forbes [publisher of
Forbes magazine] would have paid for it as one tract, rather
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. v. United States, 711 F.2d 473, 474 (1st
Cir. 1983).
127. Id. at 475-76.
128. Id. at 475.
129. Id.
130. Akers v. Comm'r, 799 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1986).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 244-45.
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than what two dozen hypothetical yuppies would have paid
for it as 24 'Ranchettes.' "136
The pre-boom conservation transactions that ended with
the landowners in court demonstrate the inherent blurriness
of land appraisals. Gray areas in the legal system result in
litigation, especially when taxpayers pursue large income tax
deductions. The following sections will reveal how, as land
conservation became more commonplace and well known,
landowners became more creative in taking advantage of the
tax system and appraisals.
2. Deceptive Practices
Some of the most lucrative and suspect tax deductions
have gone to developers and golf course owners. 1 7  For
example, some developers who subdivide land reduce their
income taxes by donating an easement restricting
development on the unusable sections of a subdivision. 3 '
Golf course owners have found a questionable practice that
results in huge tax deductions-placing conservation
easements on their fairways." 9
While wealthy developers and golf course owners have
found ways to milk the system for substantial tax deductions,
small, private landowners have also abused the system.4 ° It
is not unusual " 'for an appraiser to assume the highest
possible level of development that could be approved under
local zoning and value the land under that intense level of
build-out, totally without regard for whether there is
sufficient and realistic market demand for the product.' ""'
An inflated appraisal of a land's fair market value increases
the difference between it and the purchase price (if the land is
sold to a land trust at a reduced price) or the value of the land
136. Akers v. Comm'r, 799 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1986).
137. See Stephens & Ottaway, supra note 96; Stephens, Easement Abuses,
supra note 104.
138. See Stephens & Ottaway, supra note 96. ("Luxury-home builders in
North Carolina paid $10 million for a tract in the mountains, developed a third
of the land, then claimed a $20 million deduction.").
139. Stephens, Easement Abuses, supra note 104. In South Carolina, "[sieven
of the most lucrative tax deductions went to the owners of golf courses, who ...
claimed deductions totaling $125 million." Id.
140. See generally Stephens, Fairfax Case, supra note 104.
141. Garrison, supra note 85, at 51 (interviewing Stephen Small).
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with development restrictions (in the case of a conservation
easement), thereby enlarging the amount that can be
deducted. 142
3. Crackdown
Since the investigative spotlight focused on conservation
easement abuse, the IRS responded by placing easement
donation abuses on its "Dirty Dozen" list of tax scams"' and
by issuing notices to warn taxpayers about the consequences
regarding improper deductions for conservation easements.1 4
In its June 30, 2004 Notice, the IRS stated that it was aware
of people claiming deductions for donations of easements that
do not qualify as conservation contributions, as well as
taxpayers "claiming deductions for amounts that exceed the
fair market value of the donated easement." 45 The IRS
warned that it could disallow improper deductions, impose
penalties, and excise tax for such deductions,1 46 and could also
penalize appraisers for dishonest or fraudulent appraisals.1 41
Moreover, the IRS mandated that taxpayers claiming
deductions for donating a property interest must include the
appraisal with their return141--a requirement that also puts
appraisers under the microscope of the IRS. 4 1 The I.R.C. has
two sections relevant to the imposition of penalties for an
appraiser who participates in a gross valuation overstatement
for any deduction' 50 or aids or abets in the understatement of
a person's tax liability.' 5 ' Despite these specific
consequences, both sections impose a penalty of a mere $1000
142. See, e.g., id. (explaining how one can inflate fair market value by
considering the maximum level of development that zoning would allow even in
a remote location where demand for such a development does not exist).
143. Stephens, Fairfax, supra note 104. Every year the IRS releases a list of
notorious tax scams on which it intends to crackdown. See, e.g.,
I.R.S. Notice IR-2008-41 (Mar. 13, 2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=180075,00.html.
144. See I.R.S. Notice IR-2004-86, supra note 94; I.R.S. Notice 2004-41, supra
note 98.
145. I.R.S. Notice IR-2004-86, supra note 94.
146. I.R.S. Notice 2004-41, supra note 98.
147. See I.R.S. Notice IR-2004-86, supra note 94.
148. Garrison, supra note 85, at 51.
149. Id.
150. See I.R.C. § 6700 (2006).
151. See I.R.C. § 6701.
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for an inaccurate appraisal.'52
4. The IRS Takes a Stand
In 2006, the tax court ruled, for the first time, to
completely throw out a conservation easement and the
subsequent income tax deduction.' 5 ' Turner v. Commissioner
stands as the first major success for the IRS since it vowed to
crack down on easement abuse. 54
James D. Turner, a real estate lawyer, and his wife
acquired the 29.3-acre Grist Mill property through several
transactions in 1997 and 1998 for $2,550,000.'11 President
George Washington owned and operated Grist Mill beginning
in 1771.56 Accordingly, the property is within the Woodlawn
Heights historical overlay district near Mount Vernon,
Virginia. 5 7 Over half of the Grist Mill property is part of a
floodplain and therefore unable to be developed residentially,
although all of the property is zoned for residential use. 15
Despite floodplain restrictions that limited residential
development to thirty homes, Turner and his colleagues
characterized the land as being able to contain up to sixty-two
residences (as if the entire property, floodplain included,
could be developed).'59 Turner began talks with the Mount
Vernon Ladies' Association ("MVLA"), a private nonprofit
organization and a concerned neighbor, about the imposition
of a conservation easement should the land be developed. 60
As negotiations developed, MVLA believed that the land had
the potential to contain more than sixty homes (based on
Turner's earlier mischaracterization), which it did not want to
see happen.16' Turner agreed to donate a conservation
152. See id.; I.R.C. § 6700. Under § 6700, the appraiser may only be
penalized the amount of income derived for the appraisal if that amount is less
than $1000. I.R.C. § 6700(a)(2)(B)(1).
153. See Turner v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 299, 317 (2006); Stephens, Fairfax Case,
supra note 104.
154. Stephens, Fairfax Case, supra note 104.
155. Turner, 126 T.C. at 301.
156. Id. at 302.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 303, 306.
160. See id. at 302, 305-06.
161. Turner v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 299, 306 (2006).
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easement to Fairfax County162 that would limit the number of
homes to only thirty (the actual number of homes that could
be built) for the benefit of the historic and scenic character of
Grist Mill.163 On the same day in 1999 that Turner executed
the conservation easement to Fairfax County, he sold the
same 29.3 acres to a developer for $2,800,000 (slightly more
than what Turner had paid the previous year).164
For the 1999 income tax year, Turner claimed an income
tax deduction based on the appraised valued of the land at
$3,120,000-a value wrongly based on the assumption that
all of the property could have been developed, including the
area hindered by the floodplain.165 The United States Tax
Court held that Turner was not entitled to the deduction
because the attempted grant did not meet the requirements of
section 170(h)(4)(A) in serving a conservation purpose. 166
Therefore, it did not qualify as a conservation easement. 167
The court found that the attempted conservation easement
did not preserve open space or any historically important land
because Turner essentially developed the land as was
allowable by the floodplain classification. 168  Nothing
prohibited the new landowners from re-zoning the land,
building homes twice the size of those planned for
development, or obstructing scenic views. 169 In addition to
disallowing Turner's income tax deduction of $342,781, the
judge also ruled for a penalty of $5 6,000.170
Turner's improper transaction epitomizes how
landowners can exploit the benefits of conservation
easements. In this case, Turner's dishonesty not only cost
him the disqualification of the easement, but also a stiff
162. Although not a private land trust, Fairfax County is a qualified
organization under I.R.C. § 170(h)(3). Id. at 312.
163. Id. at 306, 309.
164. Id. at 307-09.
165. Id. at 309.
166. Id. at 317.
167. See Turner v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 299, 317 (2006).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 314.
170. Internal Revenue Code section 6662(a) provides that "if any portion of
an underpayment is due to negligence, then a taxpayer will be liable for a
penalty equal to [twenty] percent of the underpayment that is attributable to
negligence." Turner, 126 T.C. at 318 (citing I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2006)); Stephens,
Fairfax Case, supra note 104.
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penalty. Unfortunately, a developer built twenty-nine homes
on the historic land and no conservation took place because
the homes built corresponded to the number allowed under
the floodplain restriction.17' Since the legality of the tax
deduction represented the issue before the court, the court
could do no more than uphold the IRS's tax deficiency and
penalize Turner."7 2 This serves as both a major hindrance to
conservation efforts and a strong motivator to promote proper
appraisals. The next section exposes the potential wrong-
doings of a specific land trust, and discusses how land trusts,
as nonprofit organizations, should focus on the preservation
of the land trust movement itself.
B. Land Trusts in Trouble-Learning from The Nature
Conservancy
While private landowners who benefit from inflated land
valuations face consequences from the IRS, land trusts also
face repercussions for their misdeeds. Land trusts play an
instrumental role in the conservation process and aside from
facilitating inappropriate transactions, land trusts are not
insulated from their own internal issues. The expose
published in the Washington Post highlighted the unethical
and at times illegal practices of the Conservancy uncovered
by the Senate Finance Committee's investigation.7 3  The
most egregious practices involved deals with the
organization's own board members or corporate partners. 1
74
1. Conflicts of Interest
Prior to the Washington Post series, the Conservancy
routinely benefited its trustees and supporters by buying
scenic properties, restricting development through a
conservation easement (although such easements often did
not restrict residential building) and then selling the land at
a discounted rate to the trustees and supporters. 75  These
buyers would then donate cash to the Conservancy for a
171. Turner, 126 T.C. at 308.
172. See id. at 299-300.
173. See Stephens & Ottaway, supra note 96.
174. See Ottoway & Stephens, supra note 10.
175. Stephens & Ottaway, supra note 96.
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handsome income tax deduction.'76  These transactions
resulted in little, if any, costs to the Conservancy, but
provided acreage to add to its list of protected lands and made
for happy supporters and trustees. 177
The board members of the Conservancy, who work for a
variety of corporations such as General Motors, Georgia-
Pacific,'78 Orvis Services Co., 179 and S.C. Johnson & Sons
Inc. ,180 also have used their ties to the Conservancy to benefit
themselves and their companies while improving the
Conservancy's apparent success. 181  The Conservancy used
the relationships with certain board members and their
corporations to obtain discounts on the purchases of land,
products, legal assistance, and development rights.182
Although the Conservancy disclosed all such business deals to
the IRS and had the board members recuse themselves from
voting on related transactions, the Conservancy reported that
eleven board members or their corporations had dealt with
the Conservancy in one or more financial transactions since
1998.183 While these practices may not have been entirely
unethical, because the Conservancy is a nonprofit
corporation, it must protect itself from self-dealing that could
lead to the revocation of its tax-exempt status. 84
2. Corporate Partnerships
In addition to using corporate board members to secure
low-cost transactions, the Conservancy also profited from its
corporate ties by selling its logo to give corporations a kinder
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. The Conservancy made property transactions with Georgia-Pacific
amounting to nearly $8 million in 1999 and 2000. Ottoway & Stephens, supra
note 10. The $7.5 million transaction in 2000 was made with a Georgia-Pacific
subsidiary for 9500 acres of clear-cut land in Louisiana-the Conservancy
received a $1 million discount. Id.
179. Orvis Services Co., whose CEO served on the Conservancy's board,
placed a development restriction on a 1600-acre Florida hunting preserve for
$649,000 from the Conservancy. Id.
180. S.C. Johnson, whose chairman sat on the Conservancy's board, paid the
Conservancy $100,000 for the use of the Conservancy logo on ads for the




184. See Ottoway & Stephens, supra note 10.
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image."8 5 The Conservancy enabled its board members'
companies to use the Conservancy logo on its products for a
six-figure fee." 6 The addition of the Conservancy logo on
product packaging, such as on the boxes for General Mills
Nature Valley granola bars, leads consumers to believe that
they are buying environmentally friendly products, when, in
reality, all General Mills did was write a check to the
Conservancy." 7 As an offended consumer activist opined,
displaying the rented Conservancy logo "does not guarantee
the product inside is more environmentally friendly than the
next brand on the supermarket shelf' and optimizes the
conflicts of interests between the Conservancy and its board
members. 18
Having originally worked to increase the Conservancy's
corporate ties, David Morine, a former head of land
acquisition, regrets having allowed corporate executives to
serve on the board." 9 Morine blames the Conservancy's focus
on the corporate dollar on the "carnivorous" tendencies of the
executives and their propensity to take charge. 90
3. Effect on Land Trusts
The corporate ties that the Conservancy established
reveal its evolution from a private land conservation
organization into a corporate one.' 91 With its sights set on
profiting while buying and conserving land, the Conservancy
became more of a "free market conservation juggernaut" with
unethical practices 92  rather than an exemplary
representation of nonprofit land trusts. The size and
structure of the Conservancy put it on a level of its own
compared to other land trusts. 193 Despite the Conservancy
having a much broader scope and breadth of assets than most






190. See Ottoway & Stephens, supra note 10.
191. Engel, supra note 72, at 52.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 52-53.
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dark cloud over land conservation.'94 The Washington Post
and the Senate Joint Committee on Taxation did an injustice
to most local and regional land trusts by equating them with
the Conservancy.' 95 The Senate committee even went so far
as to propose an elimination of charitable contribution
deductions relating to personal residence properties. 9
Although the fallout from the Conservancy debacle
threatened the continued success of land conservation, the
legislature did expand tax incentives in 2006 with the
Pension Protection Act and "put an end to the scare caused by
the [Conservancy] scandal and the ensuing [Joint Committee
on Taxation] proposal."9 7
V. PROPOSAL: STEPS NEEDED TO PREVENT ABUSE
In light of the tax abuse and dishonest appraisal
practices described above, this comment proposes a number of
ways to avert further mishandlings. The following proposal
recommends legislation, internal practices for land trusts,
and government enforcement.
A. Legislation
1. Confidence in the Appraisal Process
Although they may be encouraged mostly by altruism,
landowners often decide to donate land or a conservation
easement to gain tax benefits. Similarly, land trusts operate
as nonprofit organizations and are therefore exempt from
income taxation. Even though donations of real property are
between a grantor landowner and a grantee land trust, the
philosophy behind land conservation is that it should benefit
the public at large. Land trusts must adhere to their
missions of conservation for the greater good while
contracting with landowners in a way that encourages
charitable giving.
Fair market valuation issues lie central to the problem of
maximizing both tax deductions and charitable donations. A
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 51.
197. Engel, supra note 72, at 54.
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high appraisal will enable the landowner to take more of a
deduction and cause the land trust to pay more in a bargain
sale. With the interested parties having different hopes for
the appraised fair market value, the transaction's outcome is
largely dependent upon the appraiser. The importance of
having an objective appraiser cannot be stressed enough. The
land acquisition process will progress smoothly if both parties
(landowner and land trust) believe that the appraisal is
objective and accurate.
Very few universal guidelines currently exist in the
appraisal process. While individual states may have
standards of their own, nationwide rules that are clear and
realistic to implement are necessary. The United States
Department of the Interior has proposed the Cooperative
Conservation Enhancement Act (the "CCEA"),1 98 which if
passed, would lessen the red tape in federal partnerships
with landowners who wish to conserve their land.1 99 This
promotion of government partnerships aims to encourage
conservation while also implementing more government
oversight. °°
Although oversight may help lessen some abusive
practices such as inaccurate appraisals, government
intervention may lack appeal to potential donors and land
trustees. Transactions with land trusts are so popular
because they provide privacy and efficiency. The CCEA aims
to reduce barriers to partnering with the government.
However, working with the government is inherently
bureaucratic and arduous. The federal government thus
should propose legislation that sets standards, while keeping
the federal government's hands out of the transactions. For
example, Congress must create specific rules regarding the
appraisal process, and more specifically, the hiring and
qualifications of appraisers and requirements for the number
and review of appraisals.
Congress can help prevent appraisal abuse by modifying
198. The text of the Cooperative Conservation Enhancement Act can be
found at http://www.doi.gov/initiatives/CooperativeConservationEnhancement%
20Act.pdf.
199. See Cooperative Conservation, About Cooperative Conservation,
http://cooperativeconservation.gov/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
200. See id.
1148 [Vo1:49
20091 LAND TRUSTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
the I.R.C. to require more objectivity in the appraisal process.
The I.R.C. currently only requires that a taxpayer complete
and submit one appraisal with his tax return.2 10 Therefore,
legislation should require that in every transaction, two
separate appraisers conduct two individual appraisals. The
appraisers should then agree to the most accurate amount.
Legislation should also require that the acquiring party,
whether a private land trust or a governmental agency, hire
the appraisers for a flat fee. Because the landowner may
collude with an appraiser to determine a high fair market
value in order to secure a larger tax break, appraisers hired
by the land trust are more likely to be unbiased. Requiring
land trusts to hire the appraisers would also increase the
likelihood that the appraisers would be familiar with open
space fair market values and other conservation easements in
the area.
Additionally, the current penalty for appraisers ($1000 at
most)20 2  is not substantial enough to deter gross
overstatements. Not only should legislation require new and
specific guidelines for obtaining appraisals, but the penalties
for the appraisers themselves should also be increased for
fraudulent valuations.
2. Land Trusts Responsible for Reviewing and Posting
Appraisals
Legislation should require that private land trusts and
state agencies report any information about the appraisers
used in land transactions along with all appraisal amounts to
the IRS or the Department of the Interior. Legislators may
also consider requiring that appraisals be made available to
the public to encourage accuracy and accountability.
Although landowners appreciate the privacy inherent in
transacting with private land trusts, they may need to
sacrifice this advantage in an attempt to uphold the integrity
of land conservation.
201. See IRS, PUBLICATION 561: DETERMINING THE VALUE OF DONATED
PROPERTY 11 (Apr. 2007).
202. See I.R.C. § 6700(a)(2) (2006).
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B. Land Trusts: Stick to the Mission
The Conservancy's poor governance taught an important
lesson to all land trusts. Land trusts are nonprofit
organizations that aim to protect land for the sake of the
environment and the public. Corporate board membership
should be discouraged or at least deemphasized. Corporate
connections are likely to lead to incentives and benefits that
draw attention away from the mission of open space
conservation and could ultimately lead to possible
disqualification of tax-exempt status.
Self-dealing and insider transactions taint the integrity
of nonprofit organizations and must be avoided. Serving as
the heart of land conservation efforts, land trusts must make
their mission statements known and publicize the ways in
which they carry out such missions. The proliferation of land
trusts since the 1980s demonstrates their instrumental role
in land preservation. The Conservancy's problems illustrate
how land trusts' reputations can be hindered when they draw
the negative attention of the IRS. Land trusts' missions must
remain central to all transactions and should not be
discounted or manipulated in favor of appeasing corporate
executives serving as board members.
C. Governmental Enforcement
Lastly, the government should better arm itself with
enforcement capabilities. The IRS's crackdown on inaccurate
tax deductions should continue, especially in the wake of new
legislation. Since the deductible amounts increased in 2006
and may be renewed permanently, the IRS is going to see
more charitable contributions to land trusts in the future.
With increased incentives, a responsible government must
have the resources to enforce the laws and uphold the
integrity of the tax system. While the IRS can revoke the tax-
exempt status of land trusts after improprieties have
occurred, the preceding legislative proposals aim to prevent
abuse of the system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Land conservation in the United States would not be
what it is today without the existence of private land trusts.
Land trusts play an integral role in the land preservation
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process, so much so that any threats to their integrity could
impact conservation efforts substantially in this country. The
vulnerabilities of conservation transactions, specifically land
appraisal inaccuracies and tax abuse, taint the process and
hinder the work of land trusts. Land conservation can
continue to be a success in the United States, especially with
governmental support of increased benefits to charitable
donors of land. Land trusts must combat deficiencies in the
system by keeping passionate board members who do not hold
controversial ties to corporations, limiting self-dealing
transactions, and espousing mission statements aimed at
environmental protection and public accessibility to scenic
open space. In conjunction with land trust veracity, proper
legislation addressing the appraisal process and government
enforcement of the tax laws will support an upstanding image
of land conservation and charitable contributions. If the
reputations of land trusts remain strong and tax laws
promote land donation, land conservation will continue to
flourish.
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